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This paper investigates the extent of per-capita income convergence in regional 
integration initiatives. Panel unit root testing is performed on 28 regional groupings. 
There is evidence of convergence in South-South integration, but this might be taking 
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1.  Issues and methodological approach 
 
The wave of regionalism in the ‘90s has spurred academic and professional interest 
towards the economic effects of regional integration agreements (RIAs). Among the 
most debated issues is the one of whether or not a RIA stimulates the convergence of 
per-capita incomes across its participants. The existing empirical literature is not 
conclusive. Ben-David (1993 and 1996) documents income convergence in the 
European Union (EU). However, for other RIAs the evidence is of a substantial lack 
of convergence or even divergence (i.e. Karras, 1997). In a recent theoretical 
contribution, Venables (2003) suggests that income dispersion across countries in a 
RIA will decrease only in the case of North-North integration
1.  
The purpose of this note is to expand the body of empirical evidence by testing for 
intra-regional income convergence in a wide sample of RIAs. Let yi and yR indicate 
(log) real per-capita income in country i and average (log) real per-capita income in 
the RIA respectively. The number of countries in the RIA (including i) is N. Let also t 
represent a generic time. Convergence is defined as a situation where the difference 
(yit - yRt) evolves into a stationary process. This is indeed a notion of convergence in 
expectations which has been widely adopted in the literature (see Hall et al. 1997 and 
Montuenga-Gomez, 2002).  
The unit root test is carried out within the panel framework developed by Im et al. 
(2003). The time-varying difference  (yit - yRt) is assumed to be generated by an AR(1) 
process:    
 
                                                 
1 For a survey of the previous theoretical and empirical work see Schiff and Winters (2003, Chapter 5). 
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where ) 1 ( i i α β − =  and  1 − − = ∆ it it it z z z ,  X are exogenous regressors which may 
consist of a constant or a constant and a linear trend, δi and βi are parameters to be 
estimated, and the εit are white noises. The model can be extended to allow for lagged 
effects of the dependent variable ∆zi: 
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Given the AR model (3), the null hypothesis of unit roots becomes  
 
(4)    0 : 0 = i H β  for all i against the alternatives  
         0 : 1 < i H β , i = 1, 2….N1,  N N N i i .... 2 , 1 , 0 2 1 + + = = β .  
 
Rejection of the null then implies that the stochastic process zi converges for all i and 
hence that per-capita incomes across member-states in the RIA tend to converge. 
Two other approaches might be used in testing for convergence within a panel 
framework of the type just outlined. First, following Levin et al. (2002), one could set 
φi = φ in equation (2) and hence βi = β in equations (2) and (3). The resulting null   3
hypothesis would be stated as  0 : 0 = β H  against the alternative  0 : 1 < β H . This 
formulation is however less general than (4). In fact, (4) allows for βi to differ across 
countries. It also allows for some (but not all) countries not to converge under the 
alternative hypothesis. Because of the cross-country heterogeneity that often 
characterizes the membership of RIAs, formulation (4) appears more appropriate. The 
second alternative approach follows Ben David (1996), who tests for convergence 
excluding additional regressors X from equation (2). Again, (4) provides a more 
general setting and hence it is preferred. 
One final issue in implementing the convergence test is to decide how many lags of 
∆zi should be added on the r.h.s. of (3) and what variables the set of regressors X 
should actually include. The lag-structure is chosen to minimise the Schwarz 
Information Criterion. With respect to the specification of X, instead, a more 
pragmatic approach is taken: results are reported for two versions of the unit root test, 
with and without individual linear trends. 
 
2.  Results and discussion 
 
The results of the convergence test on 28 groupings, covering a total of more than 100 
countries, are displayed in the table below. For each RIA, the test is carried out over a 
sample period that spans from the year of founding (or notification to GATT/WTO) 
until 2004. For some RIAs, the test cannot cover their entire membership, since data 
are missing for a few countries. When membership of a RIA changes over time, the 
test is separately run on the sample of countries before and after the change. However, 
if the change occurred after 1996, then no separate test is run. Thus, for instance, 
APEC was funded in 1989; Mexico, Papua New Guinea and Chile joined in 1993-94,   4
whilst Russia, Peru and Vietnam joined in 1998. Then, two tests are run for APEC: 
one on the original group of countries (APEC 1) over the period 1989-2004 and one 
on the original countries plus Mexico, Papua and Chile (APEC 2) over the period 
1994-2004. No test is run on APEC 2 plus Russia, Vietnam and Peru since this would 
constitute a panel with a too short time dimension. Sample periods and countries of 
the test are indicated in the first column of the table
2. 
For each RIA, the column labelled “version 1” reports the test-statistic from the 
version of the AR equation (3) which includes only individual constants. The column 
labelled “version 2” reports instead test-statistics from the version including also 
individual linear trends. As already noted, rejection of the null is to be interpreted as 
evidence that per-capita income converges across countries in a RIA. The GDP data 
used for the test are in constant prices and adjusted for PPPs
3. 
Results appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of individual linear trends. Still, a 
general message holds independently from the specification of the AR equation: per-
capita income convergence is not necessarily a prerogative of North-North 
integration. The null hypothesis is for instance always rejected for CACM, 
CARICOM, CBI, CEFTA and MERCOSUR. These are RIAs that include developing, 
                                                 
2 The following countries are not included because of lack of data : Antigua and Barbados and 
Montserrat in CARICOM ; Liechtenstein in EEA ; Brunei in APEC1 and APEC2 ; Liberia in 
ECOWAS ; Eritrea, Djibouti and Sudan in COMESA1 and COMESA2 ; Swaziland in COMESA1, 
SADC1 and SACU ; Buthan and Maldives in SAPTA, Lybia in UMA ; Turkmenistan in the CIS.  
      
3 The primary source of the data are the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2002). The series are updated 
using the data from the World Economic Outlook , September 2004, of the IMF as outlined in Gulde 
and Schulze-Ghattas (1993). 
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or at best emerging, economies and which can therefore be characterized as cases of 
South-South integration. It is also worth noting that the classical example of North-
North integration, the EU, does not lead to systematic per-capita income convergence 
according to the panel unit-root test
4.  
Yet, the optimistic picture on the convergence properties of South-South integration 
needs to be qualified. In some cases, in fact, cross-country convergence appears to be 
taking place around a relatively flat regional growth trend. That is, whilst countries in 
some South-South RIAs do converge towards the regional average, this regional 
average fails to catch-up with industrial countries’ income. This is for instance 
observed in CACM, CBI and MERCOSUR
5. Conversely, there are RIAs whose 
average income is catching-up with industrial economies, but member-states fail to 
converge to the regional mean (i.e. ASEAN, CIS, EAEC, SACU, SADC2). 
The conclusion of this empirical analysis is thus that South-South integration does not 
necessarily imply widening intra-regional disparities; however it might lead to a form 
of convergence to the bottom. The extent to which institutional characteristics of a 
RIA (i.e. its degree of openness towards the rest of the world, its composition in terms 
                                                 
4 Applying the Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test results in a larger number of RIAs for which 
evidence of convergence is detected. Particularly, the null of a unit root is rejected for several African 
RIAs, where however cross-country heterogeneity is a problem. Ben David’s (1996) version of the test 
results instead in a less frequent rejection of the null of a unit root. Still, the null is rejected for all of 
the RIAs for which the Im et al. (2003) test also leads to rejection under both versions. 
 
5 In proportion to US income, average income in CACM drops from 78.9 percent to 77.9 percent 
between 1993 and 2004, in CBI average income drops from 73 percent to 71.7 percent between 1992 
and 2004, in MERCOSUR average income drops from 86.5 percent to 85.3 percent between 1991 and 
2004. 
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of number of countries and their initial degree of heterogeneity, the depth of the 
economic integration process it aims at) determine both the tendency of member 
countries to converge towards the regional average and the tendency of the average to 
catch-up with industrial economies is certainly an avenue of interesting future 
research. 
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Regional integration Agreements, membership covered by the test, and 
sample period 
 
Version 1  Version 2 
ANDEAN (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela), 1991-2004  0.095  -0.465 
APEC 1 (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, US, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan), 
1991-2004 
-1.422* -0.190 
APEC 2 (Apec 1 plus Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Chile), 1993-2004  -1.916**  0.690 
ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) 1977-2004  0.500  1.834 
CACM (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica), 1993-
2004 
-2.689*** -1.526* 
CARICOM (Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent), 1980-2004 
-1.764** -1.883** 
CBI (Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe), 
1992-2004 
-2.179** -4.398*** 
CEFTA (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), 
1993-2004 
-1.230* -1.648** 
CEMAC (Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon), 1964-2004 
0.386 2.845 
CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine), 1994-2004 
-0.225 -0.615 
COMESA 1 (Angola, Burundi, Comoros Islands, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe), 1982-2004 
1.426 1.568 
COMESA 2 (Comesa 1 plus Swaziland), 1993-2004  -0.801  -3.455*** 
EAEC (Russia, Kyrgyz Republic, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan), 1994-
2004 
0.322 0.406 
ECOWAS (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo), 1975-2004 
1.534 -1.833** 
EEA (EU 3 plus Iceland, Norway), 1994-2004  -0.012  0.821 
EU 1 (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece), 1981-2004 
5.760 1.890 
EU 2 (EU2 plus Portugal, Spain), 1986-2004  0.794  -0.201 
EU 3 (EU2 plus Austria, Finland and Sweden), 1994-2004  -1.783**  -0.292 
LAIA (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela), 1980-2004 
-0.706 0.366 
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay), 1991-2004  -1.876**  -1.724** 
NAFTA 1 (Canada, US), 1989-2004  -3.306***  -1.398* 
NAFTA 2 (Nafta 1 plus Mexico), 1994-2004  -3.387***  -2.017** 
SACU (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland), 1960-2004  1.913  -2.294*** 
SADC 1 (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe), 1980-1993 
-1.925** -0.658 
SADC 2 (Sadc 1 plus South Africa), 1994-2004  0.217  -2.261** 
SAPTA (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), 1995-2004  -0.599  0.783 
UEMOA (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo), 1973-2004 
0.947 -1.427* 
UMA (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia), 1989-2004 
 
-1.113 -2-231** 
Note  : For each regional initiative, the table reports the list of member countries included in the 
econometric test and the sample period of the test. Test-statistics are reported for two versions of the 
test. In version 1, the AR equation includes individual effects. In. version 2 the AR equation includes 
individual effects and linear trends. The selection of lags in the AR equation is based on the Schwarz 
Information Criterion. *, **, *** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, 1% confidence 
level respectively.  
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